Friday, November 30, 2018

Twain's Library

A Twain treasure hunt

Alan Gribben has spent almost 50 years hunting down Mark Twain’s formidable personal library, which housed more than 3,000 titles. In the first volume of his findings, Mark Twain’s Literary Resources: A Reconstruction of His Library and Reading (NewSouth Books, 2019), Gribben presents the discoveries of his life’s work, uncovering Twain’s favorite books as well as his “Library of Literary Hogwash.” Gribben then takes a fresh look at Twain’s writing with an eye towards the influences of the author’s personal reading.
Gribben teaches English at Auburn University at Montgomery. He previously taught at The University of Texas at Austin, during which time he wrote a biography on Harry Huntt Ransom, the founder of the Harry Ransom Center.
Austin Downey: You’ve been searching for books in Twain’s private library for nearly 50 years. How did you first become interested in doing this?
Alan Gribben: In 1967 I had the good fortune to become employed by Frederick Anderson (1926–1979), the fifth editor of the Mark Twain Papers. I was to be one of his editorial assistants for the Mark Twain Project, a publishing series underway in the Bancroft Library at the University of California at Berkeley, the campus where I was studying for my doctorate degree in English. Two years later, I needed to choose a dissertation topic. During my editorial stint at the Mark Twain Project I made a point of inquiring of visiting scholars about research topics that might benefit the field of Mark Twain studies. To a person, they answered: “Please, someone, undertake an inventory of Mark Twain’s library and reading.” They explained that any scholar writing on Twain had to check dozens of disparate sources that revealed bits of his literary knowledge, but even after considerable effort the facts often proved elusive.
Owing to auctions authorized by Twain’s daughter in 1911 and 1951, Mark Twain’s library books had been widely scattered across the United States and consequently the contents of his collection remained relatively unexplored, providing an ideal opportunity for a graduate student who wanted to contribute something useful to the academic discipline I wanted to enter.
What have been some of your most exciting finds?
There have been many. I ordered from the UCLA library a copy of George Combe’s Notes on the United States of North America (1841) and was astonished to receive from the Interlibrary Borrowing Service Twain’s own copy, inscribed and annotated. I notified the Library of this find and it was added to the University of California Berkeley’s Mark Twain Papers collection.
In the 1970s, I drove a Volkswagen Beetle across the country to visit places where I might find parts of the library, including Twain’s home, booksellers and libraries holding Twain’s collections, and the relatives of Twain’s housekeeper, Katy Leary, who had been awarded books from the author’s library after his death. In Rice Lake, Wisconsin, I found sacks of books left on the porch for a charity store by an elderly relative of Leary’s. Imagine my surprise to discover that these brown paper bags contained almost 90 books belonging to Twain and his family! Many of them were signed and annotated by Twain himself.
I paused to remember that I had vowed never to collect any books from Twain’s library, even if the opportunity presented itself for a bargain, or in this case, were free for the taking. Because I had made clear my intentions to booksellers and collectors, I enjoyed unstinting cooperation from book dealers, collectors, scholars, and librarians. In this case I found a phone book and made calls trying to locate relatives of the elderly woman to alert them about the treasures about to be carted away. Luckily, I found a daughter who immediately met me at her mother’s home. Eventually that collection was donated to Elmira College in Elmira, New York.
How did your knowledge of Twain’s annotations help you find copies from his libraries? 
Twain began writing witty comments in his book margins during his courtship of Olivia Langdon, the daughter of a coal magnate. This habit left behind confirmations that he read certain books and recorded his reactions to passages in the books, whether complimentary or derisive. Twain read intensely with pencil or pen in hand, ready to express an opinion. Twain also sought out poorly written works to add to his “Library of Literary Hogwash.” Among his mocking notes are these: “an honest and upright idiot who believed he knew something of the English language,” “quaint fashion of building English sentences on the German plan,” and “that tiresome Ericson & his dismal ‘poetry’—hogwash, I call it.” Forgers occasionally attempt to emulate Twain’s marginalia to inflate the price of nineteenth-century book, but a thorough knowledge of Twain’s handwriting enables experts to detect these spurious efforts. 
You devote several chapters to the connection between Twain’s work and the work of other writers that he read. How did you find these connections, and as a Twain scholar yourself, what do they mean to you? 
In the Mark Twain Papers at Berkeley, I read Twain’s personal notebooks and voluminous correspondence looking for clues to his reading and literary resources—the plays he attended, the songs he heard, the newspapers he read. I also heard from numerous scholars who sent me tips about references Twain made in his books or writing.
I greatly admire and am indebted to Kevin Mac Donnell, an Austin, Texas rare book dealer and Mark Twain collector, for sharing his erudition about both Twain and that era of American literature. His knowledge seems almost infinite, and his collection of Twainiana contains more than 9,000 items. Mac Donnell is hands-down the world’s leading collector of Mark Twain items.
A chapter in Volume One of my Mark Twain’s Literary Resources titled “Stolen from Books, Tho’ Credit Given” addresses his indebtedness to travel guidebooks produced by other authors as he was writing his own. Twain sold his books through subscription services rather than in retail stores. The buyer of a subscription book expected bulky tomes. Twain was giving subscribers their money’s worth in extra pages of descriptions. Twain would elaborate on what others wrote, embroider details, and correct their impressions in his The Innocents AbroadFollowing the Equator, and other travel narratives.
In countless instances of literary allusions in his writings, Twain borrowed details. For example, in Huckleberry Finn’s chapters that deal with Jim’s imprisonment, Tom Sawyer and Huck create cruel tasks for Jim purportedly necessary for his escape. Twain was imitating the authors of popular dungeon literature of the time: Dumas, Casanova, Saintine, and Baron von Trenck. In Huckleberry Finn, Twain also has fun with the Duke’s misquoted version of Hamlet’s soliloquy.
What did you find in the Ransom Center archive that contributed to your research? What do you think is the value of archival sources?
The Ransom Center owns a number of choice items from Twain’s library. Although known for its British collection, the Ransom Center has substantial American literature holdings. While reconstructing Twain’s library I was able to steer quite a few association copies once owned by Twain or his family to the Ransom Center. Among other enviable acquisitions, the Ransom Center possesses Susy Clemens’s volumes of Shakespeare.
The information in the annotated catalog is scholarly in nature, but accessible to the general reader, too. A large percentage of the books listed in Mark Twain’s Literary Resources invite further and fuller investigations by young scholars regarding their connections to Twain and his era.
Can you give us a hint of what’s to come in the next volumes?
The forthcoming Volumes Two and Three of Mark Twain’s Literary Resources: A Reconstruction of His Library and Reading (NewSouth Books, 2019) contain the annotated catalog. Here in alphabetical order is the heart of my almost half-century of research. These volumes will be a greatly expanded version of my 1980 Mark Twain’s Library: A Reconstruction, which was based on my 1974 doctoral dissertation of 2,370 pages.
I had imagined a new type of reference work for my dissertation. Instead of the accepted form of simply listing the surviving books from a writer’s personal library or attempting to deduce his or her reading from textual evidence, I combined all of the known information about book titles, inscriptions, marginalia, scholarly commentaries and other facts and conveniently assembled them in one location. In addition, I added my own commentary about various authors. The new 2019 edition will conclude with a vast index covering all of the titles, editors, illustrators, co-authors and co-editors, pseudonyms, and even subjects such as colonialism, slavery, women’s rights, art history, the Roman empire, cookbooks, gardening, natural history, and many other topics.

Fascism in Action

How fascism works

A Yale philosopher on fascism, truth, and Donald Trump.

Nearly 100,000 Nazi storm troopers are gathered to listen to a 1933 speech by Adolf Hitler on “Brown Shirt Day.”
 Shutterstock
“Fascism” is a word that gets tossed around pretty loosely these days, usually as an epithet to discredit someone else’s politics.
One consequence is that no one really knows what the term means anymore. Liberals see fascism as the culmination of conservative thinking: an authoritarian, nationalist, and racist system of government organized around corporate power. For conservatives, fascism is totalitarianism masquerading as the nanny state. 
A new book by Yale philosopher Jason Stanley is the latest attempt to clarify what fascism is and how it functions in the modern world. Stanley focuses on propaganda and rhetoric, so his book is largely about the tropes and narratives that drive fascist politics. 
I spoke with him recently about what fascism looks like today, why the destruction of truth is so essential to fascist movements, and whether he thinks it’s accurate to call President Donald Trump a fascist, as some have
A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.

Sean Illing

Almost everyone means something different when they use the word “fascism.” What do you mean by it?

Jason Stanley

I think of fascism as a method of politics. It’s a rhetoric, a way of running for power. Of course, that’s connected to fascist ideology, because fascist ideology centers on power. But I really see fascism as a technique to gain power. 
People are always asking, “Is such-and-such politician really a fascist?” Which is really just another way of asking if this person has a particular set of beliefs or an ideology, but again, I don’t really think of a fascist as someone who holds a set of beliefs. They’re using a certain technique to acquire and retain power. 

Sean Illing

So fascism isn’t a discrete category — it’s a spectrum? Or a sliding scale?

Jason Stanley

Right. And my book identifies the various techniques that fascists tend to adopt, and shows how someone can be more fascist or less fascist in their politics. The key thing is that fascist politics is about identifying enemies, appealing to the in-group (usually the majority group), and smashing truth and replacing it with power. 

Sean Illing

We’ll get into some more of those techniques, but I’m curious why you think fascism is so hard to pin down as an ideology. People on the left see fascism as the endpoint of right-wing reactionary thinking, and people on the right see fascism as nanny-state totalitarianism. Obviously, it can’t be both of these things. 

Jason Stanley

I think it’s clearly right-wing. Part of the problem is that “right” and “left” are tricky to talk about, and it’s true that there are dangerous forms of extremism on both sides, but fascism tilts pretty heavily to the right in my view. 
If you think about fascism as a sliding scale, ordinary conservative politics is going to find itself somewhere on that scale — which is not to say that it’s fascist at all, any more than ordinary Democratic politics is communist. But just as extreme versions of communism suppress liberty on behalf of radical equality, so too do extreme versions of right-wing politics, namely fascism, suppress liberty in favor of tradition and dominance and power.

Sean Illing

Your specialty is propaganda and rhetoric, and in the book you describe fascism as a collection of tropes and narratives. So what, exactly, is the story fascists are spinning?

Jason Stanley

In the past, fascist politics would focus on the dominant cultural group. The goal is to make them feel like victims, to make them feel like they’ve lost something and that the thing they’ve lost has been taken from them by a specific enemy, usually some minority out-group or some opposing nation.
This is why fascism flourishes in moments of great anxiety, because you can connect that anxiety with fake loss. The story is typically that a once-great society has been destroyed by liberalism or feminism or cultural Marxism or whatever, and you make the dominant group feel angry and resentful about the loss of their status and power. Almost every manifestation of fascism mirrors this general narrative. 

Sean Illing

Why is the destruction of truth, as a shared ideal, so critical to the fascist project?

Jason Stanley

It’s important because truth is the heart of liberal democracy. The two ideals of liberal democracy are liberty and equality. If your belief system is shot through with lies, you’re not free. Nobody thinks of the citizens of North Korea as free, because their actions are controlled by lies.
Truth is required to act freely. Freedom requires knowledge, and in order to act freely in the world, you need to know what the world is and know what you’re doing. You only know what you’re doing if you have access to the truth. So freedom requires truth, and so to smash freedom you must smash truth. 

Sean Illing

There’s a great line from the philosopher Hannah Arendt, I think in her book about totalitarianism, where she says that fascists are never content to merely lie; they must transform their lie into a new reality, and they must persuade people to believe in the unreality they’ve created. And if you get people to do that, you can convince them to do anything. 

Jason Stanley

I think that’s right. Part of what fascist politics does is get people to disassociate from reality. You get them to sign on to this fantasy version of reality, usually a nationalist narrative about the decline of the country and the need for a strong leader to return it to greatness, and from then on their anchor isn’t the world around them — it’s the leader.

Sean Illing

This is partly why I think of fascism as a kind of anti-politics. I remember reading a quote from Joseph Goebbels, who was the chief propagandist for the Nazis, and he said that what he was doing was more like art than politics. By which he meant their task was to create an alternative mythical reality for Germans that was more exciting and purposeful than the humdrum reality of liberal democratic politics, and that’s why mass media was so essential the rise of Nazism. 

Jason Stanley

That’s so interesting. The thing is, people willingly adopt the mythical past. Fascists are always telling a story about a glorious past that’s been lost, and they tap into this nostalgia. So when you fight back against fascism, you’ve got one hand tied behind your back, because the truth is messy and complex and the mythical story is always clear and compelling and entertaining. It’s hard to undercut that with facts.

Sean Illing

This is probably a good time to pivot to the glittering elephant in the room: Donald Trump. Is he a fascist?

Jason Stanley

I make the case in my book that he practices fascist politics. Now, that doesn’t mean his government is a fascist government. For one thing, I think it’s very difficult to say what a fascist government is. 
For another thing, I think the current movement of leaders who use these techniques (Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan in Turkey, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, to name a few) all seek to keep the trappings of democratic institutions, but their goal is to reorient them around their own cult of personality. 
Again, I wouldn’t claim — not yet, at least — that Trump is presiding over a fascist government, but he is very clearly using fascist techniques to excite his base and erode liberal democratic institutions, and that’s very troubling. 
But the blame there is as much on the Republican Party as it is on Trump, because none of this would matter if they were willing to check Trump. So far, they’ve chosen loyalty to Trump over loyalty to rule of law. 

Sean Illing

In the book, you imply that there’s something inherently fascist about American politics, or at the very least that fascism has always been a latent force in America. Can you elaborate on that?

Jason Stanley

Well, the Ku Klux Klan deeply affected Adolf Hitler. He explicitly praised the 1924 Immigration Act, which severely limited the number of immigrants allowed to enter the US, as a useful model. 
The 1920s and the 1930s was a very fascist time in the United States. You’ve got very patriarchal family values and a politics of resentment aimed at black Americans and other groups as internal threats, and this gets exported to Europe.
So we have a long history of genocide against native peoples and anti-black racism and anti-immigration hysteria, and at the same time there’s a strain of American exceptionalism, which manifests as a kind of mythological history and encourages Americans to think of their own country as a unique force for good. 
This doesn’t make America a fascist country, but all of these ingredients are easily channeled into a fascist politics. 

Sean Illing

And yet at the same time there are countervailing forces that push us in the opposite direction, and so America exists in this perpetual tension between liberal democracy and reactionary fascism. 

Jason Stanley

Absolutely. America is exceptional in good ways as well. 
We have an exceptional devotion to liberty and equality, as embodied in our struggle for civil rights and our fight against fascism in World War II. I’m corny about these things, and I believe America has had truly great moments and has made a lot of progress. 
But, as you said, the fascist threat is always lurking, and we just have to be aware of it. 

Sean Illing

What does your book have to say about the way forward? If we are indeed threatened by fascist movements, both here and abroad, what can citizens and governments do about it?

Jason Stanley 

We should heed the warning of the poem on the side of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which says, “First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out because I was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out because I was not Jewish. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak for me.” At a certain point it’s too late.
We learned first from that poem who the targets are. The targets are leftists, minorities, labor unions, and anyone or any institution that isn’t glorified in the fascist narrative. And even if you’re not in any of those groups, you have to protect those who are, and you have to protect them from the very beginning. Simple acts of courage early on will save you impossible acts of courage later.
To be clear, this isn’t alarmist. We’re not on the brink of some fascist takeover. But there are reasons to be concerned, and we should always be on guard — that’s the lesson of history. Our weapons are our high ideals of liberty and equality, and we have to fight to keep those American ideals. 
We’re fortunate enough to have liberty and equality baked into our founding ideals. We have a long history of people appealing to those ideals and saying, “We might disagree on a number of things but we agree that truth, liberty, equality are things we stand up for.” So whatever happens, we have to continually double down on those ideals — that’s what will save us. 

Thursday, November 29, 2018

Cohen Pleads Guilty


Prosecutors laid out a litany of lies that Cohen, a former personal attorney to President Trump, admitted telling about a Moscow real estate project that Trump pursued while he ran for office. 

Wednesday, November 28, 2018

The End of November 2018

We end November waiting on Mueller, Trump continuing to lie and lie and lie, another year coming to an end.  Too bad we live in a dystopian Trumpian world.  His poison will take years to dissipate if it ever does.

Renee C. Romano and Claire Bond Potter - Historians on Hamilton (Book Review)

This book is a collection of articles on the Broadway play Hamilton with what historians say about the play.  I always take historical entertainment skeptically always assuming liberties are taken with all of the facts.  I will probably never see the play so I don't have a dog in this discussion.  Suffice it to say that most of the play seems to be historically correct, but history is always a matter of interpretation, and Alexander Hamilton is certainly an historical figure who needs interpretation.  Hamilton is a Broadway musical, not a work of history, like the movie Lincoln, which is not to say the history is not right, but as with such entertainment details and nuances and historically balanced perspectives have to be sacrificed.  The play is one entertainer's point-of-view.

Joanne Freeman is the editor of Library of America's Hamilton collection of writings.

-In the play we get a sense of Hamilton's modern, forward-thinking proposals as opposed to the play's backward thinking world of slave-holding Thomas Jefferson.
-But we don't see the passions and ideals behind Hamilton's policies.
-We don't see his desperate desire to strengthen the national government---to an extreme degree.
-We don't learn of his disposition to seek military solutions to political problems.
-We don't see his deep distrust of the masses and democracy.
-Until his dying day, Hamilton believed that the American republic was bound to fail.

Hamilton feared the democratic multitude.  Wasn't he right to do so?  Wouldn't he be appalled by Trump?  Surely.

The instabilities of the populace were bound to lead to anarchy and ruin.  Witness what happened with the French Revolution.  The real disease was DEMOCRACY.

Hence, Hamilton's predilection for military solutions.  Always cited is the so-called Whiskey Rebellion (which quickly fizzled out).

Hamilton's distrust of democracy was heartfelt.  He fretted about the "unthinking populace."  He was a conservative revolutionary.  He believed in the stability of law and order above all.

Debt assumption would reinforce the federal government authority and power.  A brokered deal with Madison and Jefferson pulled assumption thru.

Hamilton's defense of his national bank to President Washington began the idea of the broad interpretation of the Constitution ensuring the power of the national government.

Hamilton said in 1803 that in order to have a chance to survive republican government needed as much energetic government as republican theory would allow.  (Makes sense)

His continued praise for the government of Great Britain worked for his reputation as a monarchist.

His biggest backers WERE conservative money-men eventually known as federalists.

The Republicans had their own agrarian, small-government vision of the country.  Heartfelt like Hamilton, but not popular anymore.  Federalists fought to empower the new national government and the first Republicans fought to limit it.

"Hamilton reduces this conflict to a battle between past and present, depicting Hamilton as a forward-looking avatar of the future who envisioned a powerful, industrialized America and did his best to push the nation toward that goal as opposed to a backward-looking agrarian, slave-supporting Jefferson.  There is some truth in this telling.  Over time, the United States followed in the early modern British Empire's footsteps, becoming a world power economically, militarily, and politically, as the Federalists had hoped.  And by twenty-first century standards, Jefferson's yeoman-farmer centric vision of the United States seems premodern."  P. 50

I learned from this book how controversial Hamilton has been throughout history.  I had no idea.  Too bad he has been largely superseded by Jefferson at least until recent years.






Saturday, November 24, 2018

The Saturday After Thanksgiving 2018

The more details that are revealed, the more we see the depth of the Democratic victory on November  6.  Democratic votes exceeded Republican votes.  Were it not for Republican gerrymandering, we would have even more victories.  What will Democrats do with the House majority?  How long before Mueller makes his big moves?

Wednesday, November 21, 2018

1215


I just had the sudden urge to stand up in place and recite the Magna Carta, which is puzzling since I have no clue what's in that venerable document. A crazy urge, no doubt, or else the onset of something ominous. Hope it passes before it's time for my afternoon nap. I need a clear and lucid mind for napping.

Tuesday, November 20, 2018

About Pelosi


The last thing the Democrats need is a circular firing squad. Unite around Pelosi.

Sunday, November 18, 2018

Rake


Trump the forest ranger? Why not? I can picture him wandering around in the woods lost, raking leaves to prevent fires, rubbing sticks together to start a fire to keep warm, living off the land. He seems to have plenty of free time on his hands being President.

We Wait

We wait for January for the Democrats to take over the House.  What will they do?
We wait for Mueller to make his move.  What will he do?
We wait for Politics 2020 to begin.  What will happen?

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

8-Ball Tournament


Squeegy is having an 8-ball tournament at the pool hall today. Be there or be square. Starts at 2 give or take an hour or two. Depends on who shows up and when they show up. Showing up is the key at the Pelham Pool Hall. Some of us still shoot a good stick. At least we like to think so.

Nationalism Has Its Virtues

A military parade celebrating Bastille Day in Paris in 2018GONZALO FUENTES / REUTERS
We all have books that have influenced how we make sense of the world. One of my favorites is Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History, a short book by the Canadian American historian William McNeill that was first published in 1985. I recently learned that McNeill died in the summer of 2016, not long after Britain voted to leave the European Union and shortly before Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. It occurs to me that McNeill would have had a great deal to say about the reassertion of nationalism around the world, and I regret that he is not here to share his thoughts with us. This is not because I expect that McNeill would echo my own beliefs—indeed, I am confident he would not—but rather because his work might help reorient our perspective.
Though McNeill was very much a skeptic of nationalism, he taught me, in a roundabout way, to appreciate its virtues. Critics of nationalism often point to the fact that it is a relatively novel doctrine, and they’re not wrong to do so. What they tend to neglect, however, is that the same can be said of nationalism’s chief rival: the ideal of a cultural pluralism that is bereft of hierarchy. In liberal circles, “nationalism” is typically understood as a divisive, exclusionary force, usually in implicit contrast with some form of cultural pluralism, and so to identify as a nationalist is to declare oneself a chauvinist.
But as McNeill suggests, nationalism can be understood as a unifying alternative to a society built on polyethnic hierarchy, in which a series of hereditary ethnic castes live together in uneasy peace, usually with some dominating the others. It is polyethnic hierarchy that has been the norm throughout modern history, not national unity or egalitarian pluralism. One could argue that the dream of pluralism without hierarchy is at least as chimerical as that of an egalitarian nationalism built on the melting and fusing together of once-distinct groups, if not far more so. McNeill’s stylized history gives us a sense of what we’re up against as we try to build decent and humane societies amidst entrenched ethnic divisions, and why so many modern thinkers have embraced the politics of national unity.
Until around the mid-18th century, McNeill argued, ethnic-political unity in major civilizations from Europe to the Mediterranean to the Asian steppe “was often illusory and always fragile.” The 19th-century ideal of the homogenous nation-state, which took off with particular intensity in revolutionary France, was something of a historical anomaly, one that the epic demographic and ideological shifts of the bloody 20th century would begin to erase. Today we may find ourselves at another major turning point in the relationship between state and ethnos.
McNeill cites three factors that obstructed the formation of stable and cohesive national identities for much of recorded history. First, in the premodern period, the continuous conquest and reconquest of vast territories by rival bands of military nomads competing for resources ensured continuous ethnic mixing and upheaval, especially in major population centers. “The rise of nomadry as a way of life,” McNeill writes, “acted on the peoples of Eurasia like an enormous gristmill, grinding the peasant majority exceedingly hard since it was they who suffered plunder and paid taxes, sustaining their military masters and all the other occupational specialists who congregated in cities and maintained the arts and skills of civilization.”
The second fact of premodern and early-modern life that forced urban ethnic mixing was the prevalence of fatal infectious diseases in populous areas. Mortality rates were so high that cities were not able to sustain their population through reproduction alone, and while some of the labor shortage could be made up by organic migration from nearby rural areas, political elites more often than not resorted to the importation of ethnic “others” as slaves, helots, or serfs from their imperial peripheries. Even the classical city-states of Athens and Rome, sometimes regarded as model egalitarian liberal republics, would soon transform into mighty empires whose capitals were flooded with foreign-born ethnic outsiders who were politically and economically subordinate to the dominant class of Greek or Roman citizens.
Finally, different ethnic groups interacted with one another vigorously because of widespread economic exchange and missionary activity. Trade “gave birth to permanent communities of aliens in major urban centers,” and “the rise of portable and universal religions … provided an effective cultural carapace for trade diasporas, insulating them from their surroundings in matters of faith and family as never before.” The result is that across Eurasia, while ethnic homogeneity was common in the rural countryside, the cities that acted as the seats of political power and civilizational progress were defined by polyethnicity, or a hierarchy of ethnic castes. With notable exceptions, including in the Empire of Japan and early Macedon, few political elites “assumed that uniformity was desirable or that assimilation to a common style of life or pattern of culture was either normal or possible.”
According to McNeill, the first real approximations of national states in Europe—that is, political units that corresponded with ethnic boundaries—began to form in the late Middle Ages: “France and England, along with a fringe of others: Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Poland and perhaps Portugal as well.” But even these early quasi-states were not well defined or self-sufficient. The watershed event in the birth of nationalism as an idea was the French Revolution, which touched off an era of new and vigorous claims to ethno-national solidarity across the continent and beyond. McNeill cites four historical patterns that made this eruption possible.
The first was the influence of civic humanism. Beginning in the late Middle Ages, many European thinkers began to regard the classical political traditions of Greece and Rome as the pinnacle of human organization. As noted before, Greece and Rome had quickly become polyethnic empires, but 19th-century thinkers fixated on (a stylized version of) their early years, in which groups of men bound by the bonds of brotherhood created a single civic culture and determined their own destiny. A level of ethnic homogeneity in northern European towns made this ideal seem close enough to a reality that it took off with particular force, and “reformers of the eighteenth century [tried] to revive Roman republican virtue in all its glory.”
Starting around the mid-18th century, this intellectual change was paired with an equally revolutionary demographic one. Thanks to changes in disease patterns and new agricultural technologies, populations began to soar at a pace unprecedented in world history. The emergence of surplus labor in the countryside had two effects across Europe: First, the need for political elites to forcibly import labor from abroad was greatly diminished, and “even great cities like London and Paris could maintain an approximation to ethnic homogeneity.” Existing urban hierarchies were disrupted. Moreover, economic displacement in the countryside fomented political upheaval, and underemployed workers were an enthusiastic constituency for revolutionary and nationalistic movements.
Advances in literacy and communication, often propelled by Protestant missionaries, also played a role in increasing cohesion, as languages became “a powerful new basis for expanding and delimiting national boundaries and for communication within the national group so defined.” Linguistic commonality also promoted commerce tying together towns and the countryside, and helped state bureaucracies expand and deepen their links with the population in their jurisdiction.
The fourth factor in McNeill’s account of the rise of ethnic-political unity was military modernization. As in Rome and Greece, participation in the armed forces forged solidarity between citizens of European national groups, melting them together like no other experience could. And new military technology made national governments more capable of maintaining their borders, suppressing uprisings, repelling invasions, and cultivating commerce. The military primacy of Napoleonic France made other budding nations look to replicate its success. Ultimately, however, the military might of the 19th-century European nation-state would “undermine its own social basis” by producing a world not of states but of empires, and later of wars so devastating that they significantly reduced the prestige of the ethno-nationalist ideal.
Perhaps the most familiar chapter of McNeill’s story, at least in today’s political environment, is the rise of globalization that occurred after the world wars of the first half of the 20th century—the “accelerated mingling of diverse peoples within state boundaries that we everywhere witness in our own time, and specifically since World War I.” His key insight is to frame this rise of polyethnicity over the past century not as a new development, but as “a return to normal,” at least “as far as Western European nations are concerned.”
The most important reason for the pivot away from nationalism was ideological. The destruction of the First World War and the genocidal imperialism of the Second World War (which paradoxically included high levels of ethnic mixing in the form of Nazi slave labor) effectively discredited nationalism among European elites. This contributed to the creation of new international structures, like the European Union, that facilitated cooperation, immigration, and the fading of ethnic boundaries between nation-states. Another ideological spillover effect from the ethnic horrors of the war was that subnational ethnic identities gained renewed prestige.
As with the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, its decline in the second half of the 20th also had a strong demographic component. The enormous number of casualties from the war created a labor imbalance in Europe, which caused emigrations of large populations of people looking for work from southern European countries to wealthier northern ones. The Soviet Union also saw substantial internal relocation under Stalinism. And in the longer run, declining birth rates in Western countries, fueled by birth control, economics, and changing social norms, created a demand for more labor, and rising birth rates in the Middle East and global South provided the supply.
Finally, there are the trappings of globalization we are all familiar with: airplanes, tanker ships, and computers—“improvements in communication and transport that continually nibble away at once-formidable obstacles to human interaction at a distance.” Transnational commerce is now regulated by international structures like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There is also a military dimension to the new globalization. (“Garrisons stationed permanently … on foreign soil constitute another significant form of polyethnicity.”) And, of course, McNeill was writing before the fall of the Soviet Union, which supercharged the global trend toward polyethnicity during the 1990s, as millions of people previously confined behind the Iron Curtain migrated to other countries across the globe and Cold War–era restraints on international movement of all kinds were lifted.
McNeill concluded his argument with a prediction that is darkly relevant to the present day: “Social strains and frictions are almost sure to increase within nations playing host to different ethnic groups; and sporadic resort to riot and even wholesale murder is likely.”
He also pointed to the fundamental challenge of polyethnicity throughout world history: “Efforts to sustain equality in face of actual differences in skill and custom have met with very limited success … Other civilized societies have almost always accepted and enforced inequality among the diverse ethnic groups of which they were composed.” These two observations point to the world-historical challenge confronting us: to navigate our polyethnic reality while keeping social peace and without compromising the nonnegotiable principles of equal citizenship. That is, to transition into a more diverse future without succumbing to the caste hierarchy of late-imperial Rome or to the bellicose nationalism of early-20th-century Prussia.
Does the future belong to egalitarian cultural pluralism, in which sharp group distinctions remain yet ethnic hierarchy somehow melts away? Or should we pursue a melting-pot nationalism, in which bright boundaries between groups blur over time, and civic equality and national unity prove mutually reinforcing? I’ve come to believe that the latter ideal is ultimately the more realistic and fruitful. But I’m keenly aware that the clash between these two visions won’t be resolved anytime soon.