Why We Regulate
By PAUL KRUGMAN
One of the characters in the classic 1939 film
“Stagecoach” is a banker named Gatewood who lectures his captive audience on the
evils of big government, especially bank regulation — “As if we bankers don’t
know how to run our own banks!” he exclaims. As the film progresses, we learn
that Gatewood is in fact skipping town with a satchel full of embezzled cash.
As far as we know, Jamie
Dimon, the chairman and C.E.O. of JPMorgan Chase, isn’t planning anything
similar. He has, however, been fond of giving Gatewood-like speeches about how
he and his colleagues know what they’re doing, and don’t need the government
looking over their shoulders. So there’s a large heap of poetic justice — and a
major policy lesson — in JPMorgan’s shock announcement that it somehow managed
to lose $2 billion in a failed bit of financial wheeling-dealing.
Just to be clear, businessmen are human — although the
lords of finance have a tendency to forget that — and they make money-losing
mistakes all the time. That in itself is no reason for the government to get
involved. But banks are special, because the risks they take are borne, in large
part, by taxpayers and the economy as a whole. And what JPMorgan has just
demonstrated is that even supposedly smart bankers must be sharply limited in
the kinds of risk they’re allowed to take on.
Why, exactly, are banks special? Because history tells
us that banking is and always has been subject to occasional destructive
“panics,” which can wreak havoc with the economy as a whole. Current right-wing
mythology has it that bad banking is always the result of government
intervention, whether from the Federal Reserve or meddling liberals in Congress.
In fact, however, Gilded Age America — a land with minimal government and no Fed
— was subject to panics roughly once every six years. And some of these panics
inflicted major economic losses.
So what can be done? In the 1930s, after the mother of
all banking panics, we arrived at a workable solution, involving both guarantees
and oversight. On one side, the scope for panic was limited via
government-backed deposit insurance; on the other, banks were subject to
regulations intended to keep them from abusing the privileged status they
derived from deposit insurance, which is in effect a government guarantee of
their debts. Most notably, banks with government-guaranteed deposits weren’t
allowed to engage in the often risky speculation characteristic of investment
banks like Lehman Brothers.
This system gave us half a century of relative
financial stability. Eventually, however, the lessons of history were forgotten.
New forms of banking without government guarantees proliferated, while both
conventional and newfangled banks were allowed to take on ever-greater risks.
Sure enough, we eventually suffered the 21st-century version of a Gilded Age
banking panic, with terrible consequences.
It’s clear, then, that we need to restore the sorts of
safeguards that gave us a couple of generations without major banking panics.
It’s clear, that is, to everyone except bankers and the politicians they
bankroll — for now that they have been bailed out, the bankers would of course
like to go back to business as usual. Did I mention that Wall Street is giving
vast sums to Mitt Romney, who has promised to repeal recent financial reforms?
Enter Mr. Dimon. JPMorgan, to its — and his — credit,
managed to avoid many of the bad investments that brought other banks to their
knees. This apparent demonstration of prudence has made Mr. Dimon the point man
in Wall Street’s fight to delay, water down and/or repeal financial reform. He
has been particularly vocal in his opposition to the so-called Volcker
Rule, which would prevent banks with government-guaranteed deposits from
engaging in “proprietary trading,” basically speculating with depositors’ money.
Just trust us, the JPMorgan chief has in effect been saying; everything’s under
control.
Apparently not.
What did JPMorgan actually do? As far as we can tell,
it used the market for derivatives — complex financial instruments — to make a
huge bet on the safety of corporate debt, something like the bets that the
insurer A.I.G. made on housing debt a few years ago. The key point is not that
the bet went bad; it is that institutions playing a key role in the financial
system have no business making such bets, least of all when those institutions
are backed by taxpayer guarantees.
For the moment Mr. Dimon seems chastened, even
admitting that maybe the proponents of stronger regulation have a point. It
probably won’t last; I expect Wall Street to be back to its usual arrogance
within weeks if not days.
But the truth is that we’ve just seen an object
demonstration of why Wall Street does, in fact, need to be regulated. Thank you,
Mr. Dimon.
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