Abraham Lincoln was elected President in November of 1860. Seven slaveholding states promptly seceded from the country. Between Lincoln's election and the first shots of war when the state of South Carolina fired on the federal fort called Ft. Sumter in Charleston Harbor in April of 1861, there was frenzied activity that stretched over those months to prevent war all finally no avail. As Lincoln said, the war came.
Lincoln had to decide what to do with federal property in the seceded states. The most vexing question was what to do with Ft. Sumter. Lincoln ultimately, craftily, decided to publicly resupply the fort with supplies, daring the South Carolinians to stop him. What was in Lincoln's mind as he settled on this strategy?
How have historians treated Lincoln's decision? How do we judge the beginning of the war?
In 1935 Professor Charles Ramsdell made the argument that Lincoln purposely compelled the Confederates to fire first. Hence, Lincoln must bear full responsibility for instigating war.
"Lincoln, having decided that there was no other way than war for the salvation of his administration, his party, and the Union, maneuvered the Confederates into firing the first shot in order that the, rather than he, should take the blame of beginning bloodshed." P. 185
"According to the Ramsdell argument, Davis and the rest of the Confederate leaders desired peace. They were eager to negotiate a settlement and avoid a resort to arms. But Lincoln, not so peaceably inclined, refused to deal with them." P. 185
In my view, Lincoln surely desired peace as well, but not at the expense of recognizing the CSA and therefore approving the dismemberment of the nation.
"During the weeks that followed his inauguration he was beset on two sides. Coercionists demanded that he take forceful action to rescue Fort Sumter. Moderate men advised him to yield the fort. If he should use force, he might impel the states of the Upper South to secede, and perhaps the border states as well. If he should abandon the fort, the majority of his part would probably abandon him. While he hesitated, his fellow Republicans bickered among themselves, his administration declined in prestige, and the country drifted toward ruin. He had to make up his mind soon, before the Sumter garrison was starved out." P. 185-86
Current thinks Ramsdell thinks Lincoln must have hit upon a solution in this manner. He could induce the Confederates to attack the fort. This would give the country's permission to use all of the political capital from the probably effusion of patriotism, the flag having been fired upon. Republicans and Democrats would come together, the border states would respond with loyalty, and wavering millions would rally to the Union cause. The country would be saved. P. 186
Lincoln was very shrewd. Perhaps he was.
Send the provision. Give public notice of it. Notice could mean different things to different people. His words would seem innocent to Northerners. His words would seem like a threat to the South. If the provisioning were resisted, arms would follow. P. 186-87
According to Current, presenting the Ramsdell hypothesis, the ruse worked perfectly. The object was to provoke a shot that would rouse the Northern people to fight. From this perspective, Lincoln must have felt that war was inevitable and it was just a matter of who fired the first shot, and he meant for the first shot to be fired by the South. P. 187
So goes the Ramsdell explanation.
There have been other historical explanations.
James G. Randall expected a peaceful provisioning of the fort. So did David Potter. P. 188
David Potter also supports Lincoln's peaceful intentions. He counted on a resurgence of Unionism in the South to overcome secession and war. Potter says that Lincoln withheld a forceful assertion of Federal power so long as he could do it without obviously surrendering the fort. He would have surrendered Sumter had he been able to save Fort Pickens as a substitute symbol of Federal authority. But events forced him to act, but he took care to make it as unprovocative as possible. By such means he hoped to maintain the status quo in Charleston Harbor. His plan backfired leading to a calamitous war. P. 188
"In between the Randall-Potter thesis of the peace policy and the Ramsdell-Tilley thesis of the war maneuver, there is yet a third interpretation which sees Lincoln's policy as aiming at neither war or peace, as such, but as risking the chance of war. Professor Kenneth M. Stampp, of the University of California, stated this thesis of the calculated risk in the Journal of Southern History and restated in his book And the War Came (1950. According to Stampp, Lincoln's primary purpose was to preserve the Union and to do so by a 'strategy of defense' which would avoid even the appearance of initiating hostilities. P. 188-89
The claim that Lincoln faked the hunger threat at Sumter an be dismissed out of hand. P. 189
Did Lincoln think he could provision Ft. Sumter without encountering a military response by the South Carolinians? There is no way to know what Lincoln THOUGHT. P. 190
Current says that Lincoln probably considered hostilities likely, but that peace was still possible. P. 193
Peace was barely possible Lincoln might have thought, but he did deliberately provoke hostilities. If a first shot was fired, Lincoln was determined it would be fired by the other side. P. 194
Currents summary of the likely scenario. P. 202-208
"When Lincoln expressed his desire for peace he was sincere, and so was David when he did the same. But Lincoln thought of peace for one, undivided country; Davis of peace for two separate countries. Both deprecated war, as Lincoln later put it, but one of them would make war rather than let the country survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. P. 208
Nice author's summary.
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