This is the most comprehensive and detailed history of the making of the Constitution. As the title suggests, it was a coup. The author is a law professor at Harvard. The book is impressive to say the least.
Michael J. Klarman is an American legal historian, and constitutional law scholar,[1] the Kirkland & Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School.[2] Formerly, he was James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of History, and Elizabeth D. and Richard A. Merrill Research Professor at the University of Virginia School of Law.[3] Klarman specializes in the constitutional history of race.[4] He contends that the Supreme Court of the United States has historically been hostile to the rights of minorities and has not consistently enforced constitutional protections for them. Klarman argues that civil rights protections arise out of social mores from which the court takes its cue.[1][5] (From Wikipedia)
Americans revere their Constitution. However, most of us are unaware how tumultuous and improbable the drafting and ratification processes were. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men bring with them "all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views." One need not deny that the Framers had good intentions in order to believe that they also had interests. Based on prodigious research and told largely through the voices of the participants, Michael Klarman's The Framers' Coup narrates how the Framers' clashing interests shaped the Constitution--and American history itself.
The Philadelphia convention could easily have been a failure, and the risk of collapse was always present. Had the convention dissolved, any number of adverse outcomes could have resulted, including civil war or a reversion to monarchy. Not only does Klarman capture the knife's-edge atmosphere of the convention, he populates his narrative with riveting and colorful stories: the rebellion of debtor farmers in Massachusetts; George Washington's uncertainty about whether to attend; Gunning Bedford's threat to turn to a European prince if the small states were denied equal representation in the Senate; slave staters' threats to take their marbles and go home if denied representation for their slaves; Hamilton's quasi-monarchist speech to the convention; and Patrick Henry's herculean efforts to defeat the Constitution in Virginia through demagoguery and conspiracy theories.
The Framers' Coup is more than a compendium of great stories, however, and the powerful arguments that feature throughout will reshape our understanding of the nation's founding. Simply put, the Constitutional Convention almost didn't happen, and once it happened, it almost failed. And, even after the convention succeeded, the Constitution it produced almost failed to be ratified. Just as importantly, the Constitution was hardly the product of philosophical reflections by brilliant, disinterested statesmen, but rather ordinary interest group politics. Multiple conflicting interests had a say, from creditors and debtors to city dwellers and backwoodsmen. The upper class overwhelmingly supported the Constitution; many working class colonists were more dubious. Slave states and nonslave states had different perspectives on how well the Constitution served their interests.
Ultimately, both the Constitution's content and its ratification process raise troubling questions about democratic legitimacy. The Federalists were eager to avoid full-fledged democratic deliberation over the Constitution, and the document that was ratified was stacked in favor of their preferences. And in terms of substance, the Constitution was a significant departure from the more democratic state constitutions of the 1770s. Definitive and authoritative, The Framers' Coup explains why the Framers preferred such a constitution and how they managed to persuade the country to adopt it. We have lived with the consequences, both positive and negative, ever since. (From Amazon summary)
"Finally, this book advances a view of the founding that differs somewhat from those previously offered. Plainly, no single motive or explanatory variable can account for the making of the Constitution. However, experts will realize that I have been especially drawn to the view, long advanced by others, that the Constitution was a counterrevolution against what leading American statesmen regarded as the irresponsible economic measures enacted by a majority of state legislatures in the mid 1780's, which they diagnosed as a symptom of excessive democracy." P. X
I still wonder about Beard's economic interpretation.
Madison shrewdly pointed out that the differences at the convention was not between the large states and the small states but between the slave states and the non-slave states.
In his preface the author states his affinity with Woody Holton. Should I read Holton's book?
At the close of the Constitutional Convention 9/17/87 Benjamin Franklin was amazed that the document was as perfect as it was given the diversity of the men who produced it. P. 1
The "better" Americans did not look with favor on state actions to alleviate debt and issue paper money. P. 83
At Philadelphia the Southern states supported a strong national government if they were assured that their power reflected their large slave populations and that the Constitution properly protected slavery. The radical states rights dogma that built up in the decades before the Civil War was entirely lacking in Philadelphia. The Southerners felt that demographic growth would favor the South and that therefore they could control the federal government. P. 154
Madison's loss of federal veto of state laws was his most bitter loss at the convention. P. 168
The biggest contentious issue at the convention was that of representation. Twice the convention voted for representation by population but ended up with a committee that recommended the so-called Connecticut Compromise which called for each state to receive 2 Senators. This recommendation passed. We could easily ended up with proportional representation in the Senate.
The real differences between the states, Madison figured, was between the slave and the non-slave states. P. 203
The Southern states opposed the Connecticut Compromise. This surprises me. I assumed they favored it to support their peculiar institution. But the author says the Southern delegates thought that projected population increases favored population gains in the South; hence, the Southern states favored proportional representation in the upper chamber that would be to their benefits going forward. P 203-04
The Connecticut Comprise was for the small states. Its approval affected how much power was to be given to the national government. P. 204-05
James Wilson of Pennsylvania wanted the people to select the Senate at the outset. Having the lower house pick the Senate was voted down from the beginning. This was in the Virginia Plan. P. 206
As I read this book I am amazed at the work of this group of exceptional people. The issues they had to tackle and the decisions they had to make are amazing.
The author makes his point that the convention had a decidedly nationalistic focus.
"The most essential danger of the present system," Richard Henry Lee told Patrick Henry, "arose from its tendency to a consolidated government instead of a union of confederated states." P. 318
Let's face it: the Antifederalists had good arguments. P. 319
The necessary and proper clause connected to the Congress's enumerated powers aroused the ire of the Antifederalists. The opponents were correct in their concern over this this clause. Chief Justice Marshall invoked the necessary and proper clause in his McCulloch vs. Maryland ruling in 1819. Madison realized that the Constitution would not have been approved had there been an agreement on the expansive nature of this clause. P. 322
Antifederalists railed against the almost unlimited power of the federal government to levy direct taxes on the people. P. 325
The vast majority of those who favored debt relief were Antifederalists. P. 386
The author acknowledges that the Federalists exaggerated the nation's problems. At the same time, the Federalists really believed that the future of the country was in grave peril. 397
Ratification could have failed as the vote was close in a number of states. P. 398
The ratifications in the various states were vicious. All means of attack were let loose on both sides. "Both sides also published fake letters and essays in the newspapers." P. 404
It was the "better" sort of people who tended to live in the coastal cities who favored the Constitution. P. 409
The implementation of the new Constitution was at stake in the elections of 1788 with the election of the House and the election of state legislators who who pick the Senate. Not to fear: Federalists dominated the elections. It helped that some Federalists gave in to adopting amendments. P. 568
Madison presented the Federalist arguments against the need for amendments before the Constitution was ratified. After the document was ratified, he led the fight for amendments which led to the Bill of Rights when it probably wasn't necessary for amendments to be adopted for the Constitution to move forward. Many Federalists didn't want amendments afterwards. How to account for his behavior with regard to amendments?
"Contingency categorized not just the adoption of the Constitution but also many of the substantive provisions in it. The Constitutional Convention nearly decided against authorizing any federal courts other than the US Supreme Court. In addition, the delegates in Philadelphia adopted the Constitution's mechanism for selecting the president---through a college electors who are appointed in a manner by state legislatures---only after first overwhelmingly repudiating that methods and after considering and rejecting numerous alternatives. Indeed, before its final rejection, one of those alternative methods of choosing the president---selection by Congress---had been tentatively but repeatedly embraced by the convention. How to choose the president was a vitally important question:If the president by Congress, the US government might have become more like the parliamentary democracies that dominate the modern world, in which the executive is heavily dependent upon the legislature. Yet the Philadelphia convention resolved this issue through the incessant deliberations that seemed, in the end, to produce an almost random solution." P. 599
As the convention proceeded, positions on issues were subject to change depending on compromises that had been reached on previous issues. "Delegates took positions based on compromises that had been provisionally agreed upon; had those compromises unraveled, many matters of importance would have been up for grabs." P. 599
"The compromises undertaken in Philadelphia also illustrate the extent to which the Constitution was a product of clashing interests rather than dispassionate political philosophizing. . . Yet while these were remarkable men, their interests were rather ordinary. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men, no matter how talented, bring with them 'all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.' " P. 600
The Federalists had interests but preferred to believe that they were disinterested---a natural aristocracy of talent, education, and virtue---and they could rise above selfish interests. P. 600
"Yet while the Federalists considered themselves disinterested, in reality they simply held different interests than their opponents." P. 600
The author makes it sound like the making and push for ratification was a con job by the Federalists.
Some conclusions:
The convention might not have happened, but it did. The convention might have easily broken up, but it didn't. The proceedings were a process of continuous compromises, political considerations more than philosophical arguments. The presence of George Washington might have made the difference. The Federalists had the advantages in the ratification process. Nine votes put the new pact into play which effectively pressured the other states to follow suit. The Federalists at first did not want amendments. They got their wish in not passing structural changes and the sanctioning of another convention, but agreed led by Madison to rights amendments even though they didn't feel they were necessary. Evidently Madison thought it was necessary to make the new constitution safe by adding the Bill of Rights. I see the motivations of the 55 men as primarily economic as they fought too much democracy in the states. The economic elites stood to gain the most from the new constitution. The motivations of the antifederalists were varied and hard to tease out. City vs. rural. Debt relief and low taxes vs. taxes to make the country economically sound. Lots of motivations going on in the ratification process.
Michael J. Klarman is an American legal historian, and constitutional law scholar,[1] the Kirkland & Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School.[2] Formerly, he was James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of History, and Elizabeth D. and Richard A. Merrill Research Professor at the University of Virginia School of Law.[3] Klarman specializes in the constitutional history of race.[4] He contends that the Supreme Court of the United States has historically been hostile to the rights of minorities and has not consistently enforced constitutional protections for them. Klarman argues that civil rights protections arise out of social mores from which the court takes its cue.[1][5] (From Wikipedia)
Americans revere their Constitution. However, most of us are unaware how tumultuous and improbable the drafting and ratification processes were. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men bring with them "all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views." One need not deny that the Framers had good intentions in order to believe that they also had interests. Based on prodigious research and told largely through the voices of the participants, Michael Klarman's The Framers' Coup narrates how the Framers' clashing interests shaped the Constitution--and American history itself.
The Philadelphia convention could easily have been a failure, and the risk of collapse was always present. Had the convention dissolved, any number of adverse outcomes could have resulted, including civil war or a reversion to monarchy. Not only does Klarman capture the knife's-edge atmosphere of the convention, he populates his narrative with riveting and colorful stories: the rebellion of debtor farmers in Massachusetts; George Washington's uncertainty about whether to attend; Gunning Bedford's threat to turn to a European prince if the small states were denied equal representation in the Senate; slave staters' threats to take their marbles and go home if denied representation for their slaves; Hamilton's quasi-monarchist speech to the convention; and Patrick Henry's herculean efforts to defeat the Constitution in Virginia through demagoguery and conspiracy theories.
The Framers' Coup is more than a compendium of great stories, however, and the powerful arguments that feature throughout will reshape our understanding of the nation's founding. Simply put, the Constitutional Convention almost didn't happen, and once it happened, it almost failed. And, even after the convention succeeded, the Constitution it produced almost failed to be ratified. Just as importantly, the Constitution was hardly the product of philosophical reflections by brilliant, disinterested statesmen, but rather ordinary interest group politics. Multiple conflicting interests had a say, from creditors and debtors to city dwellers and backwoodsmen. The upper class overwhelmingly supported the Constitution; many working class colonists were more dubious. Slave states and nonslave states had different perspectives on how well the Constitution served their interests.
Ultimately, both the Constitution's content and its ratification process raise troubling questions about democratic legitimacy. The Federalists were eager to avoid full-fledged democratic deliberation over the Constitution, and the document that was ratified was stacked in favor of their preferences. And in terms of substance, the Constitution was a significant departure from the more democratic state constitutions of the 1770s. Definitive and authoritative, The Framers' Coup explains why the Framers preferred such a constitution and how they managed to persuade the country to adopt it. We have lived with the consequences, both positive and negative, ever since. (From Amazon summary)
"Finally, this book advances a view of the founding that differs somewhat from those previously offered. Plainly, no single motive or explanatory variable can account for the making of the Constitution. However, experts will realize that I have been especially drawn to the view, long advanced by others, that the Constitution was a counterrevolution against what leading American statesmen regarded as the irresponsible economic measures enacted by a majority of state legislatures in the mid 1780's, which they diagnosed as a symptom of excessive democracy." P. X
I still wonder about Beard's economic interpretation.
Madison shrewdly pointed out that the differences at the convention was not between the large states and the small states but between the slave states and the non-slave states.
In his preface the author states his affinity with Woody Holton. Should I read Holton's book?
At the close of the Constitutional Convention 9/17/87 Benjamin Franklin was amazed that the document was as perfect as it was given the diversity of the men who produced it. P. 1
The "better" Americans did not look with favor on state actions to alleviate debt and issue paper money. P. 83
At Philadelphia the Southern states supported a strong national government if they were assured that their power reflected their large slave populations and that the Constitution properly protected slavery. The radical states rights dogma that built up in the decades before the Civil War was entirely lacking in Philadelphia. The Southerners felt that demographic growth would favor the South and that therefore they could control the federal government. P. 154
Madison's loss of federal veto of state laws was his most bitter loss at the convention. P. 168
The biggest contentious issue at the convention was that of representation. Twice the convention voted for representation by population but ended up with a committee that recommended the so-called Connecticut Compromise which called for each state to receive 2 Senators. This recommendation passed. We could easily ended up with proportional representation in the Senate.
The real differences between the states, Madison figured, was between the slave and the non-slave states. P. 203
The Southern states opposed the Connecticut Compromise. This surprises me. I assumed they favored it to support their peculiar institution. But the author says the Southern delegates thought that projected population increases favored population gains in the South; hence, the Southern states favored proportional representation in the upper chamber that would be to their benefits going forward. P 203-04
The Connecticut Comprise was for the small states. Its approval affected how much power was to be given to the national government. P. 204-05
James Wilson of Pennsylvania wanted the people to select the Senate at the outset. Having the lower house pick the Senate was voted down from the beginning. This was in the Virginia Plan. P. 206
As I read this book I am amazed at the work of this group of exceptional people. The issues they had to tackle and the decisions they had to make are amazing.
The author makes his point that the convention had a decidedly nationalistic focus.
"The most essential danger of the present system," Richard Henry Lee told Patrick Henry, "arose from its tendency to a consolidated government instead of a union of confederated states." P. 318
Let's face it: the Antifederalists had good arguments. P. 319
The necessary and proper clause connected to the Congress's enumerated powers aroused the ire of the Antifederalists. The opponents were correct in their concern over this this clause. Chief Justice Marshall invoked the necessary and proper clause in his McCulloch vs. Maryland ruling in 1819. Madison realized that the Constitution would not have been approved had there been an agreement on the expansive nature of this clause. P. 322
Antifederalists railed against the almost unlimited power of the federal government to levy direct taxes on the people. P. 325
The vast majority of those who favored debt relief were Antifederalists. P. 386
The author acknowledges that the Federalists exaggerated the nation's problems. At the same time, the Federalists really believed that the future of the country was in grave peril. 397
Ratification could have failed as the vote was close in a number of states. P. 398
The ratifications in the various states were vicious. All means of attack were let loose on both sides. "Both sides also published fake letters and essays in the newspapers." P. 404
It was the "better" sort of people who tended to live in the coastal cities who favored the Constitution. P. 409
The implementation of the new Constitution was at stake in the elections of 1788 with the election of the House and the election of state legislators who who pick the Senate. Not to fear: Federalists dominated the elections. It helped that some Federalists gave in to adopting amendments. P. 568
Madison presented the Federalist arguments against the need for amendments before the Constitution was ratified. After the document was ratified, he led the fight for amendments which led to the Bill of Rights when it probably wasn't necessary for amendments to be adopted for the Constitution to move forward. Many Federalists didn't want amendments afterwards. How to account for his behavior with regard to amendments?
"Contingency categorized not just the adoption of the Constitution but also many of the substantive provisions in it. The Constitutional Convention nearly decided against authorizing any federal courts other than the US Supreme Court. In addition, the delegates in Philadelphia adopted the Constitution's mechanism for selecting the president---through a college electors who are appointed in a manner by state legislatures---only after first overwhelmingly repudiating that methods and after considering and rejecting numerous alternatives. Indeed, before its final rejection, one of those alternative methods of choosing the president---selection by Congress---had been tentatively but repeatedly embraced by the convention. How to choose the president was a vitally important question:If the president by Congress, the US government might have become more like the parliamentary democracies that dominate the modern world, in which the executive is heavily dependent upon the legislature. Yet the Philadelphia convention resolved this issue through the incessant deliberations that seemed, in the end, to produce an almost random solution." P. 599
As the convention proceeded, positions on issues were subject to change depending on compromises that had been reached on previous issues. "Delegates took positions based on compromises that had been provisionally agreed upon; had those compromises unraveled, many matters of importance would have been up for grabs." P. 599
"The compromises undertaken in Philadelphia also illustrate the extent to which the Constitution was a product of clashing interests rather than dispassionate political philosophizing. . . Yet while these were remarkable men, their interests were rather ordinary. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men, no matter how talented, bring with them 'all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.' " P. 600
The Federalists had interests but preferred to believe that they were disinterested---a natural aristocracy of talent, education, and virtue---and they could rise above selfish interests. P. 600
"Yet while the Federalists considered themselves disinterested, in reality they simply held different interests than their opponents." P. 600
The author makes it sound like the making and push for ratification was a con job by the Federalists.
Some conclusions:
The convention might not have happened, but it did. The convention might have easily broken up, but it didn't. The proceedings were a process of continuous compromises, political considerations more than philosophical arguments. The presence of George Washington might have made the difference. The Federalists had the advantages in the ratification process. Nine votes put the new pact into play which effectively pressured the other states to follow suit. The Federalists at first did not want amendments. They got their wish in not passing structural changes and the sanctioning of another convention, but agreed led by Madison to rights amendments even though they didn't feel they were necessary. Evidently Madison thought it was necessary to make the new constitution safe by adding the Bill of Rights. I see the motivations of the 55 men as primarily economic as they fought too much democracy in the states. The economic elites stood to gain the most from the new constitution. The motivations of the antifederalists were varied and hard to tease out. City vs. rural. Debt relief and low taxes vs. taxes to make the country economically sound. Lots of motivations going on in the ratification process.
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