I picked up this slim "revisionist" account of the Reconstruction period from one of our leading Civil War historians from my bookshelf that I purchased 1/12/72 after reading that Forrest McDonald called it "radical." All the more reason to disparage Dr. McDonald.
I am delighted to find that this is such an interesting book.
There is some underlining of my making in the book. I must have it before but I have no memory of doing to.
In the opening pages the author contrasts the stirring rhetoric surrounding the War as he says both sides claimed they fought heroically for principle whereas there is no stirring rhetoric available for Reconstruction since it ended badly. Our approach should change. The South fought for principles, but it was the wrong principles. The North fought for the right principles. The radical Republicans did fight for the right principles. Only historians can see that now.
Stampp says something very interesting. Perhaps Lincoln wanted to go easy on The South during Reconstruction in a desire for personal absolution for his part in starting the war. P. 37
At first the Radicals thought President Johnson was one of their own, but they soon discovered he had a different agenda. P. 57
The big slaveholders did not drag reluctant states into secession. The vast majority of white people in the South favored secession. After the war when the Confederacy collapsed the people still wanted to be led by the old leadership. P. 66-67
An historical tradition holds that the Radical Republicans should be held responsible for the tragedy of Reconstruction. The myth is that everything was smooth under Johnson's plan, the races getting along, until the Radicals intervened. The truth is that the Johnson governments brought on the disenfranchisement, discrimination, and segregation in the postwar South. This was the situation that called for the Radicals to intervene. P. 81-82
The motivations of the Radicals were both practical, selfish, and idealistic, a mix that reflected the diversity of the Radicals. They were not one big same-thinking group of men.
Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau bill but Congress overrode his veto. P. 112
Voters gave the Republicans a big mandate in the 1866 elections for fear that under Johnson's plans the South would revert to its prewar days even bringing back slavery. The Radical Republicans took the election results as a directive to take over Reconstruction. P. 118
Much to the dismay of their former masters, most Negroes gleefully accepted their freedom. P. 121
The failure of land reform probably doomed Radical Reconstruction. P. 129
The accomplishments of the Freedmen's Bureau were many. P. 134-135
The authors of the 14th Amendment probably did not intend to outlaw state-enforced segregation. P. 139
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the first federal attempt to deal directly with social segregation, but not in schools. The Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1883. Nothing further was done until the modern civil rights movement. P. 140
In its Texas vs. White (1869) the Supreme Court ruled that secession was null and void: the Southern state had never left the Union and therefore void was Steven's conquered province theory and the state-suicide theory. P. 146
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson was obviously political as was the impeachment of Clinton. P. 150
Carpetbaggers were a mixed group and only a small minority were corrupt. P. 159
The author seems to carefully balance the pros and cons of Radical Reconstruction. P. 176
There were just as many scandals and just as much corruption in Democratic/Johnson governments as in Radical governments. P. 178
As President Grant did not have the moral fervor of the some Radicals for the freedmen. P. 187
The sad end of Radical Reconstruction as the Republican party retrenched. P. 189
Thaddeus Stevens died in August of 1868. I didn't realize that he died so soon. P. 189
As the idealism of the Radical Republicans faded and the Republican Party gained control of the states in the old Northwest the party no longer needed the votes of Southern Negroes. The Republicans could win national elections while conceding the Solid South. P. 212
The impression is created in this book that Radical Reconstruction was a force that died quickly. P. 189
"The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which could have been adopted only under the conditions of radical reconstruction, make the blunders of that era, tragic though they were, dwindle into insignificance. For if it was worth four years of civil war to save the Union, it was worth a few years of radical reconstruction to give the American Negro the promise of equal civil and political rights." P. 215
The author presents the most realistic understanding of Lincoln heading into Reconstruction that I have ever read.
After reading this book it seems to me that Reconstruction in the version of granting the freedmen equal political and social rights was doomed to fail from the beginning. There wasn't enough push and people to get it done and keep it done. The Civil War amendments stand tall, but it took more than that, and it just wasn't going to happen. For example, it took decades for the 14 Amendment to be properly applied to individuals rather than corporations and giving the Southern states back to the people who put blacks in chains gave away the whole thing.
The is is the best and most useful book I've read so far this year. It was worth the 43 year wait.
It was Nixon who found the formula for siphoning away Democratic voters. Nixon was patriotic -- he was the first president to wear the American flag in his lapel -- and he sincerely appealed to love of country. But he was more practiced, and more effective, at the politics of resentment. Nixon was a lonely outsider who became one of the most successful politicians of the 20th century (he was on five national tickets, winning four times, a record exceeded only by FDR) by tapping into a basic truth: a majority of Americans feel like they are outsiders, too. Now all candidates, Republican or Democrat, run against Washington, and they use tools first developed by Nixon, including the careful exploitation of demographic data. Nixon found in alienation a powerful political force that powered him to the top. The same force -- cautionary tale, here -- also destroyed him. The Republicans would do well to look at Nixon as the true father of their party -- and try to avoid replicating his tragic flaw.
In 1967, as he was quietly preparing his comeback from political oblivion (Nixon had narrowly lost to JFK in 1960 and then badly lost the California governor's race in 1962, acidly telling the press, "You won't have Dick Nixon to kick around any more"), Nixon read a memo from a then obscure congressional staffer named Kevin Phillips. The memo was entitled "The Emerging Republican Majority." Phillips was hired by Nixon as an "ethnic specialist" and set to work producing demographic charts and statistics that boiled down to knowing, as Phillips put it, "who hates who." With Phillips as a tutor, Nixon figured out how to play on wariness and anxiety, particularly that of blue collar Democrats who were put off by the hippies and draft dodgers of the late 1960s and frightened by racial unrest and black militants. These flag-waving, family-oriented, anti-elitist lower and middle class voters who had once cast their ballots for Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal were the base of what would, by a later generation, be called Reagan Democrats.
Nixon grasped that voters were not just driven by economic wishes but by the emerging "social issue," which in the late '60s and early '70s was what Nixon called "permissiveness." Changing social mores disconcerted voters (even as many ordinary middle class people grew their hair and shortened their skirts). Nixon rode the social issue to a landslide in 1972. He once commented that if voters were just worried about economic issues, George McGovern might have won -- the country was actually pretty liberal about taxing, spending and Big Government in 1970. So, for that matter, was Nixon, who signed a raft of social welfare legislation and created the Environmental Protection Agency.
Nixon also coined the term "the Silent Majority." He first used the expression in a speech in November 1969 castigating all the noisy anti-Vietnam War protesters. Nixon saw that the great majority of the country felt under-represented or ignored by the so-called East Coast Media Establishment. It is not a coincidence that in 1968 Nixon had hired as his media consultant a then obscure TV talk show producer named Roger Ailes -- who, of course, went on to create a news empire for Fox TV.
Nixon, it is important to note, was not angling for haters or racists. In 1968, he competed not only against Democrat Hubert Humphrey but Alabama's Governor George Wallace, who ran as an independent on the platform of "Send 'Em a Message!" Although Nixon employed a "Southern Strategy" to push the old Democratic Solid South into the Republican column, he was never overtly racist. He was accused of pandering by northern liberals, but in fact he ran as a moderate (and, indeed, after winning the presidency Nixon quietly but effectively de-segregated the public schools of the deep South).
Politically, Nixon was not a hater. Privately, he could be. This was Nixon's downfall. He let his jealousies and aggrievements, his old hurts, get the better of him. He lashed out at his enemies in the liberal press, particularly the Washington Post (he tried to strip the Post Company of its TV licenses). That was not smart fight to pick, as he learned to his dismay in the Watergate scandal. As Nixon was leaving the White House on the day of his resignation from office, August 9, 1974, he said, "Always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don't win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself."
Too late for Richard Nixon. But not too late from the Republicans -- or the Democrats. In hyper-partisan America, each side seems determined to hate the other, or at least feel morally superior.
The party that remembers that the Silent Majority was built from the entire country -- not just evangelicals, or Bi-coastals, or Red States or Blue States -- will have the best chance of getting to 51 percent in November 2016.
Evan Thomas is the author of BEING NIXON, published next week by Random House.


