Monday, March 9, 2026

 

AMERICANS SHOULD STOP USING THE TERM CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM

Religious beliefs have driven political change for centuries. The question today is which Christian values will prevail.

A photo of an American flag overlapping with a photo of a small white church
Illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: Andreas Larsen Dahl / Wisconsin Historical Society / Getty; George Marks / Getty.

In 1932, a group of religious leaders gathered in Indianapolis to advance their long-standing project, a plan to fundamentally “Christianize” American society. The meeting had been convened by the Federal Council of Churches, then the dominant voice of American Protestantism. The organization ratified a platform declaring that “the total abolition of poverty” was “entirely consistent with the ideal which Jesus and all His true disciples have taught and realized.” FCC delegates supported “a planned economic system” and called on leaders in government and across society to make that system “more rational, more productive, more humane, more righteous.”

For a time, the strategy worked. The FCC’s friends ascended to high places. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of the interior, Harold Ickes, cast the New Deal as “the carrying out of the social philosophy of the founder of Christianity.” Labor Secretary Frances Perkins poured her energies into the expansion of the American welfare state because her faith demanded nothing less. She collaborated behind the scenes with Christian leaders to advance landmark legislation, including the Social Security and Fair Labor Standards Acts, both of which she refined while on retreat at a convent in Maryland.

The concept of Christian nationalism has captured the nation’s attention in the past decade, as scholars and journalists alike have sounded the alarm about “power worshipping” believers dead set on “taking America back for God.” Yet amid the deluge of headlines and podcasts and books about the major role of religion in American politics, one barely finds mention of this vibrant world of New Deal–era social gospelers. Why? After all, these were people who longed to weave their religious values into the nation’s legal fabric. They would have scored high on some of the measures used to define Christian nationalism today, including the conviction that “U.S. laws should be based on Christian values.” And they have serious heirs in current politics, including James Talarico, a seminarian who won a close Democratic primary in a U.S. Senate contest in Texas this past week.

Progressive white Christians from the past are not the only ones left out of today’s discourse. On some recent surveys, Black Christians scored the highest on scales measuring Christian nationalism. But scholars who study the phenomenon rarely dwell on the ways that Black believers mix faith and politics. These experts often add the qualifier white in an attempt to zero in on the Christian worlds that actually concern them: namely, those aligned with the MAGA movement. Media coverage has helped to cement the association of Christian nationalist and Donald Trump–supporting Christian in the popular imagination. Little wonder that, in left-of-center circles, the label can be more derogatory than descriptive: a shorthand for believers whose politics are beyond the pale.

The narrowness of the current conversation about Christian nationalism is driven home by an important new book. Matthew Avery Sutton’s Chosen Land: How Christianity Made America and Americans Remade Christianityargues convincingly that the quest for Christian America is a perennial national obsession, one that has taken radically different shapes over time. As Sutton writes, “Christian nationalism has influenced activists across the political and religious spectrum, Black and White, left and right, for centuries. Americans have never really separated church from state, nor have they truly championed the free exercise of religion. Christian activists from Frederick Douglass to Jerry Falwell used the Bible to try to impose their values and beliefs on the nation.”

Sutton offers copious evidence for these claims. His story begins in the 15th century, with the “Christian invasion” of the Americas, and extends all the way to the present day. Drawing on an avalanche of recent scholarship as well as his own extensive research, Sutton illustrates why mainstream U.S. historians have finally begun to take the political significance of American Christianity more seriously. In short, Christian ideals, individuals, and institutions have always exerted enormous power on the country’s development. “The history of the United States is the history of American Christianity, and the history of American Christianity is the history of the United States,” he boldly declares.

A bit too boldly: People of other faiths, and those with none whatsoever, have left an indelible mark on the nation. But there is no doubting Christianity’s centrality to U.S. history, for better and for worse.

Sutton doesn’t flinch from the worse. In pursuit of Christian America, believers have too often provided theological justifications and material support for chattel slavery, Jim Crow, Indigenous displacement, and other stains on the American conscience. But as Sutton also shows, dreams of a more Christian society have animated movements for workers’ rights, women’s liberation, and Black freedom. Throughout American history, Christian nationalisms have bent in different and often contradictory directions.

Historians will find plenty with which to argue in Sutton’s epic tale. One big quibble: He casts the rise of the New Deal state as a major blow to the “already-reeling protestant establishment,” arguing, “Churches no longer competed just against each other; they now competed against the federal government for the loyalty of the American people.” There is something to this. The Great Depression did overwhelm older systems of Christian charity. But for the activists and preachers at that Indianapolis meeting in 1932, the Roosevelt administration offered new heights of power and privilege. Americans today may not associate their Social Security checks with religious reformers, but the ongoing life of such programs testifies in part to the long-lasting impact of an earlier and more economically egalitarian vision of Christian America.

The history unearthed in Chosen Land has important implications for those seeking to understand religion and politics in the present moment. Sutton’s story might help readers put a finger on an ambiguity that runs through many contemporary condemnations of Christian nationalism. Are the MAGA faithful at fault for using political structures to advance Christian values? Or does the problem lie, rather, in the specific content of their values, some of which contravene a foundational democratic commitment to pluralism?

During a recent appearance on The Late Show With Stephen Colbert, which was aired only on YouTube after threats from the Federal Communications Commission, Talarico indicted the religious right as above all “a political movement.” He told Colbert that “there is nothing Christian about Christian nationalism. It is the worship of power in the name of Christ. It is a betrayal of Jesus of Nazareth.”

Talarico’s critique verges on irony. Given his own campaign for Senate, one presumes he is not opposed to the pursuit of power by avowed Christians. In fact, in that same interview, he outlined a more biblical approach to politics, citing the Gospel of Matthew on the measure by which believers will be judged: “by feeding the hungry, by healing the sick, by welcoming the stranger—nothing about going to church, nothing about voting Republican. It was all about how you treat other people.”

Talarico and his allies should be clearer with their critique: The issue is not that Christian nationalists are building a political movement around their Christian values; it is that those values are not Christian enough. In one 2023 sermon, Talarico suggested that if the United States were actually a Christian nation, then it would embrace all of the policies for which he is fighting: student-loan forgiveness, universal health care, gay rights, and basic support for the poor.

Talarico would fit snugly into the tradition, traced in Sutton’s book, of progressive Christians who have sought, across generations, to enshrine their religious convictions in the law. Not all that long ago—in the decades stretching from the rise of the New Deal to the civil-rights era—liberal and liberationist Christians wielded tremendous power in this country. As Sutton illustrates, the remarkable breakthroughs they won sprang not only from the courageous leadership of well-known figures such as Martin Luther King Jr., but also from the work of thousands of “everyday activists” whose names have been lost to history, even as their legacy quietly persists.

Sutton hews closely to the historical record, but his book invites present-day progressives to consider the counterintuitive possibility that success might lie in an appeal for more, rather than for less, religion in public life. In some Democratic circles, the rise of MAGA-aligned Christianity has heightened an ongoing squeamishness about public-facing faith. But standing resolute behind the formal separation of Church and state does not require, as people sometimes imagine, that we evacuate religion from politics altogether. That project is a fool’s errand in any case.

As Sutton shows, most Americans, past and present, have not drawn hard lines between their religious and political convictions, let alone checked their faith at the entrance to the voting booth. Back in 2006, a presidential hopeful named Barack Obama made an argument that now belongs to a different political era. In a campaign speech, from which Sutton quotes, Obama declared, “Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King—indeed, the majority of the great reformers in American history—were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause. So to say that men and women should not inject their ‘personal morality’ into public policy debates is a practical absurdity.”

In the 20 years since Obama gave that speech, the ranks of religiously unaffiliated Americans have expanded at a historic pace. Yet Christianity has remained a political juggernaut, one largely benefiting the political right. Christians played a pivotal role in both of Trump’s electoral victories. If his opponents are to fare better in the future, one small but meaningful step could be to retire the label Christian nationalist as a term of political combat. The phrase has no stable referent in the wider scope of American history, and its dismissive edge may do more to inflame resentments than to check them—let alone change anyone’s mind.

An honest accounting requires acknowledging that reactionaries are not the only ones who have followed Jesus into the public square. Many left-of-center folks have done the same—and are doing so even today, as underscored by widespread scenes of church-based activism in the Twin Cities during the recent ICE operation there. This acknowledgement might push progressives to lay aside the unpersuasive critique that the MAGA agenda is too religious, and to focus, instead, on the specific values and policies that they believe deserve serious theological critique and concerted political confrontation.

In 1995, the historian Michael Kazin made an analogous argument about another term that tends to be overused today. In The Populist Persuasion, he notes that although populism is everywhere in U.S. history, not all populisms are created equal. Some forms are readily compatible with pluralistic democracy, but others corrode it. As Chosen Land makes eminently clear, the same is true of Christian nationalisms.

With the 250th anniversary of the United States’ founding approaching, the time is right to reflect on the far-reaching ways that fights over “Christian America” have influenced the nation’s past. Sutton’s book could spur such reflection, even though it does not offer easy answers about what comes next. The question is almost certainly not whether Christianity will shape the country of tomorrow, but rather which Christian vision of a more perfect union will gain traction in American political and cultural life. Sutton stops short of making predictions. He closes the book, instead, with a stirring reminder: What happens next is up to us.

Joel Halldorf in The Atlantic


In a clip that resurfaced recently, the polarizing influencer explained why. Books, he argued, are too slow. His brain is “far too advanced” to enjoy such a low-velocity medium: “I need action. I need constant chaos in my life to feel content.”

But what if the slowness of books is not a weakness but their virtue—and one that we, in this digital age, are at risk of losing?

The history of reading is a story of technological disruption, in which revolutionary innovations in the design and availability of books have yielded sweeping changes to how they are read.

As a scholar of the history of Christianity, I see again and again how cultural practices, including reading, depend on their material conditions. Until about the year 1000 C.E., most books were written in a style known as scriptio continua, which presented text as an unbroken stream of letters with no cues for where one word ended and the next began. These texts could not be skimmed. They had to be read aloud to “allow the ear to disentangle what to the eye seemed a continuous string of signs,” as the essayist and novelist Alberto Manguel put it.

In early medieval Europe, monasteries were the principal sites of both reading and book production. Monks and nuns read out loud for hours each day—slowly, contemplatively, and prayerfully, in a mode known as lectio divina. The absence of spacing between words compelled readers to linger and reread with care, rolling each syllable in the mouth like a sip of wine, attentive to every nuance. Reading the Bible and other spiritual classics in this way, explained the 12th-century Carthusian monk Guigo, offered “a ladder for monks by which they are lifted up from earth to heaven.”

But starting in the 11th century, a series of changes made silent reading more natural, and with that came faster reading. Spaces between words, along with chapter headings, indexes, and tables of contents, helped organize the expanding body of knowledge and made it all more readily accessible. Academics and bureaucrats welcomed the ability to consult books at a glance and extract information without reading them from beginning to end. Yet the ability to skim texts did not obviate the intellectual habits of critical reflection, contemplation, and discernment that came from slow, deep reading.

The printing press of the 15th century transformed our relationship with books by widening access to them. This triggered the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, and placed new pressure on intellectual life. Skimming was not just possible but necessary for anyone who wished to stay abreast of scholarly, political, or theological conversations.

By 1597, the scientist and philosopher Francis Bacon advised readers to reserve deep reading for a few, select books: “Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” The philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau duly lamented in 1761 that “the Frenchman reads a lot, but only new books; or to be precise, he leafs through them, not in order to read them but to be able to say that he has read them.” The rise and spread of magazines, journals, and newspapers increased the need to read with speed.

Digitization is merely the latest innovation in reading, and we are still coming to terms with the cultural consequences. If skimming seemed necessary at the dawn of the Renaissance, it now feels unavoidable. The gains in information are undeniable, but the costs to attention, contemplation, and reflection are no less profound. As the economist and Nobel laureate Herbert A. Simon famously observed: “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.”

When everything is a click away, focusing on whatever is at hand is a struggle. Digital pages are cluttered with distractions—advertisements, video clips, pop-ups—and embedded links invite readers to move on not just mid-text, but mid-sentence. Studies show that even resisting a link extracts a cognitive cost.

The erosion of deep reading weakens our capacity to grasp complex ideas. This shallowing effect reshapes the public square, allowing brief snippets of emotionally charged content to crowd out nuance, and algorithms to reinforce preferences and prejudices. If deep reading cultivates empathy, the attention-fracturing, dopamine-hitting, scroll-spurring design of digital media often undermines it.

Designated e-readers can mitigate some of these problems, but research suggests that the absence of a third dimension—the fact that we do not physically turn pages—makes remembering what we read harder. The materiality of a printed book acts as a kind of memory aid. Think about the fact that we often recall where on a page we have read something; whether it was on the right or left, top or bottom.

Today, digital reading does not complement print so much as replace it. The result is a world in which, to borrow the literacy scholar Maryanne Wolf’s phrase, “skim reading is the new normal.” A growing proportion of people never engage with print, and many admit that they struggle to read deeply at all—even when they really want to. In a study of devotional digital reading among evangelical Christians, conducted by John Dyer of the Dallas Theological Seminary, one participant confessed: “It felt a little more like skimming an email to get it done rather than really studying God’s word.”

Anyone hoping to inspire more attentive reading must do more than invoke its cognitive or moral benefits, which reduces the act to “the intellectual equivalent of eating organic greens,” the literary scholar Alan Jacobs has cautioned. Lost in this debate is the fact that slow and careful reading is a genuine pleasure. Indeed, it is one of the activities most associated with a state of focused immersion known as “flow.” Recently, while reading the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgaard’s latest novel, I found myself so immersed in the story that time and space seemed to dissolve. This kind of absorption, when the world recedes and the mind is wholly captured, is an experience not unlike religious ecstasy. And, as both historical evidence and neurological studies suggest, it is a state better facilitated by printed books than digital screens.

Even so, I often catch myself glancing at that stack of books on my desk, then at my watch, thinking there is hardly enough time to make a dent in the pile. So I send off a few emails instead, which feels productive. But in my anxiety about to-do lists and opportunity costs, I overlook the real pleasure of communing with text on a page. If I can indulge in this for even a few minutes, why wouldn’t I?

So I try to see reading not as a plate of vegetables, but as a glass of wine. Just as we don’t sip an earthy red in order to work our way through the stocks in a cellar, we shouldn’t read just to diminish the pile of books on our desk. There is pleasure in an attentive sip.

This kind of gratification is rather different from that which Andrew Tate tends to celebrate. But as a Dominican monk whom I met in Lund once told me: It is not the glutton who truly loves food, but the connoisseur. The richness of reading grows when we give it that most precious resource: time. Like rushing through the Louvre, skimming misses the point.

 


Gullible, Cynical America

The trouble with believing anything and nothing at the same time

A photo collage in purple and yellow depicting a cow, RFK jr, a hand holding a vial, and other images
Illustration by Ben Kothe / The Atlantic. Sources: Dimitrios Kambouris / Getty; Stefani Reynolds / Bloomberg

Many americans believe that vaccines are unsafe, but will jab themselves full of performance enhancers. They think seed oils cause chronic disease, but beef tallow is healthy. They’ll say you can’t trust federally insured banks, but you can trust the millionaires who want you to invest in their volatile vaporware crypto tokens. They think food additives are toxic but support an administration removing all restrictions on pumping pollutants into the air and water. They’ll insist that you can’t trust scientists, because they’re part of the conspiracy. The podcaster selling you his special creatine gummies, though? He seems trustworthy.

The coronavirus wasn’t the only epidemic to hit the United States in the past decade. Americans are also facing a bizarre epidemic of gullibility and cynicism—gullicism, if you need a portmonteau—that is drawing people into a world of conspiracism and falsehoods, one where facts are drowned out by a cacophony of extremely loud and wrong voices. Reliable information is both more available and harder to find than ever—and those who spread misinformation have been rewarded with positions of power, platforms they can exploit to further pollute the information environment.

There’s nothing wrong with being a little crunchy, but we’re well beyond the recommended dosage here. America’s top health official, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., staked his political career on the false belief that vaccines cause autism, and has used his power to force federal agencies to support his bonkers position: The CDC’s website now says“Studies have not ruled out the possibility that infant vaccines cause autism.” Thanks to Kennedy and others, measles outbreaks are happening all over the country after the disease was declared officially eliminated in the U.S. 26 years ago. More than 3,200 cases (since the start of 2025) and at least two deaths of unvaccinated children later, the head of Medicare and Medicaid, Mehmet Oz—you might remember him for his clout-chasing attempt to foment panic about arsenic in apple juice—was driven to beg Americans to trust the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine.

“Take the vaccine, please,” Oz said on CNN. “We have a solution for our problem.”

Our problem, though, is unfortunately bigger than the measles outbreak, bigger even than anti-vaccine sentiment. The spread of anti-vax conspiracy theories is just another example of the gullicism that defines our age. The cynicism is highly selective: Gullicists see everyone’s hidden motives—except when they don’t. They are able to reject any claim rooted in actual evidence—whether in science, politics, or history—while embracing the most breathtakingly absurd assertions on the same topics. Indeed, documentation is often taken as further evidence of conspiracy, while assertion (that this or that will “detoxify” your blood or that COVID deaths were exaggerated) is taken as gospel.

This rejection of empiricism makes selling falsehoods easier and contradicting them harder, which creates a fertile environment for anyone with something to sell, whether shady businesses or authoritarian governments.

Gullicism creates not just a void but also an opportunity. It creates an ideal business opportunity for snake-oil salesmen to peddle products whose whole appeal is that they’re not scientifically validated. What is ultimately being sold is the feeling that consumers can prove they’re smarter than those snooty experts who think they know everything—and who probably are in on the conspiracy to deprive you of the truth.

As a result, people baselessly attribute all kinds of negative effects to seed oils or inorganic food, but never question the motives of the person hawking alternatives that can cost twice as much. Others invest their life savings in crypto, on the grounds that the paper-currency collapse—foretold by goldbugs since the New Deal—is coming any day now, just you wait, sheeple. Struggling to save for retirement? Don’t trust those greedy money managers with your savings; double your money instead by betting on sports or prediction markets. Truth becomes entirely subjective—just another consumer product, a way to advertise your personal brand.

Private companies can and do downplay the safety risks of their products in order to sell them more effectively. Ironically, this sort of dishonesty is the origin of the modern anti-vax movement. The disgraced doctor Andrew Wakefield was working on a different kind of vaccine when he published the fabricated and since-retracted study that sparked the original claims that MMR vaccines cause autism. He later tried to defend himself by accusing the CDC of falsifying data to hide the connection—which, characteristic of so many conspiracists these days, is what he actually did. To be an anti-vaxxer, one must be simultaneously credulous and distrustful—credulous of hucksters, and distrustful about empiricism. A gullicist.

Such theories are an example of what Nancy Rosenblum and Russell Muirhead describe in their book A Lot of People Are Saying as “the new conspiracism.” They portray a nation so “disoriented” by nonsense claims that people struggle to determine what is true. The new conspiracism is characterized by the absence of prescriptive solutions—it offers “no notion of what should replace the reviled parties, processes, and agencies of government once covert schemes are revealed.”

But that’s not quite right. What replaces these processes is snake oil: wellness products that cure no one, firearms and freeze-dried food for an inevitable but always delayed apocalypse, volatile digital tokens in exchange for real money. These substitutes provide nothing useful or tangible—only the self-esteem boost that comes from feeling like you understand infectious diseases better than an epidemiologist (or whatever expert told you something you didn’t want to hear). In some cases, the replacement is even worse—between anti-vax lunacy and shots of raw milk in the Oval Office, we appear to have a grand political coalition for returning to the days when people regularly died of diarrhea. You, too, can be a lone, rugged wolf rising above the masses of sheep. (At least until the listeria gets you.)

That’s exactly how the cryptolords and gambling companies and supplement salesmen want you to feel, because if they can sell you that feeling, they can sell you anything at all. That goes for politicians, too.

To some extent, all information is based on trust. We were not present for the Constitutional Convention of 1787; we have to trust that the records of that era are being interpreted accurately by historians—and that the records are accurate to begin with. The reality is that no matter how intelligent you are, if everyone you trust is telling you something false, you are likely to believe it. And if everyone you distrust tells you something true, you are likely to disbelieve it. As the writer Will Wilkinson wrote in 2022, “Building a relatively accurate mental model of the world doesn’t have all that much to do with your individual reasoning capacity. It’s mostly about trusting and distrusting the right people.” Anyone successfully isolated by an algorithm can get got—a few wrong decisions, and you’re listening to someone who thinks sunscreen causes cancer.

That’s not to say that experts are always right. Plenty of ballyhooed studies have been later discredited—the “red wine makes you live longer” one comes to mind. Historians revise their assessments of past events all the time. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once wrote, “Time has upset many fighting faiths,” including those of people with graduate degrees. Revising one’s views when we have access to new information—actual, validated information—is not nefarious.

Our fighting faiths, however, are not so much being upset as validated by those who profit from our attention. Keeping that attention is vital, even if the best way to do so is through algorithms that distribute turbocharged and ever-changing ideological fictions. The more disoriented you are, the easier prey you become.

President Trump and his advisers understand these dynamics very well. After the administration struck Iran last year, Trump complained that the press had not echoed his claim that Iran’s nuclear program had been destroyed: “CNN is scum. MSDNC is scum. The New York Times is scum. They’re bad people. They’re sick.” Then, to justify another strike, his adviser Steve Witkoff claimed that Iran was a “week away” from having the materials to make a nuclear weapon. The White House page from last June denouncing as “fake news” the notion that Iran’s program hadn’t been “obliterated” remained online even as the United States and Israel were in the process of attacking Iran.

These are, of course, mutually exclusive lies. In that way, they’re much like the right wing’s take on the Epstein files, which were supposedly the world’s most important conspiracy theory right up until information about Epstein’s ties to conservative figures—including Trump and his former adviser Steve Bannon—emerged, at which point many insisted that the story no longer mattered. Loyalty demands that you ignore the contradiction; just accept the lie of the moment.

The philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote in The Origins of Totalitarianism that “a mixture of gullibility and cynicism is prevalent in all ranks of totalitarian movements.” She argued that “the whole hierarchical structure of totalitarian movements, from naïve fellow-travelers to party members, elite formations, the intimate circle around the Leader, and the Leader himself, could be described in terms of a curiously varying mixture of gullibility and cynicism.” All are ruled by “the central unchanging ideological fiction of the movement.”

The naive fellow travelers need to be gullible enough to believe these fictions and cynical enough to refuse correction. The inner circle need only be cynical enough to sell them.

A culture of gullicism is ideal for MAGA. First, it lets the government off the hook for actually governing, because if you believe, as Kennedy does, that you can fix most Americans’ health problems with diet and exercise, then there’s no need for state interventions in poverty or health care. And second, it undermines trust in empirical evidence, making the peddling of self-serving lies far easier.

The misplaced trust that might lead one to overlook the agenda of businessmen pushing useless vaporware tokens is the same impulse that convinces someone that Venezuela hacked voting machines to rig the 2020 U.S. election, then hid all the evidence. There’s no way the man who ran a fraudulent university and had photos of his inauguration altered to make the crowd seem bigger would make something up! Gullicism is what allows Marco Rubio to gush about the “president of peace,” who has bombed more countries than any other president in history.

Americans on the left are not immune to conspiracism, of course. You can easily find people who think Elon Musk rigged the 2024 election for Trump, or that the latter faked the assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, in 2024. But conspiracism does currently have a partisan skew: Trump’s false claims have embedded these habits of thought within the conservative movement. Democratic leadership did not validate online nonsense about fake assassination plots and a rigged 2024 election, while most Republican leaders have repeated or declined to challenge Trump’s lies.

Part of what’s going on here is that people want a simple explanation for their troubles in a complicated world. Autism? It’s vaccines. Disease? Some foods are “poison.” Trouble with your kid? Must be brainwashed by … novels? Video games? Rap music? (This one depends on the decade.) The One True Reason trains a mind not only to reject complexity but to accept bigotry—which is why it’s so ideal for reactionary politics. No housing? Immigrants. No job? Immigrants. Inflation? Immigrants. Immigrants? It’s the Jews.

Lately, however, even some conservatives have begun to lament this monsterthey’ve helped create. The right-wing activist Christopher Rufo, who peddled garbage about Haitian immigrants eating pets, recently complained that “the right’s brain is getting melted in a vat of slop, conspiracy and algorithm chasing.” But conservatives built that vat. Using legal and political pressure, they pressed the platforms to eschew any consistent or responsible content moderation in the hopes they would serve as frictionless distributors of conservative propaganda. They got their wish.

That said, blaming Rufo and other right-wing activists alone would understate the severity of the problem. We have a data economy that thrives on selling products we don’t need for problems we don’t have, and a public that falls for these ploys—even as we think ourselves much too clever to be fooled.